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1. Introduction  
A fundamental contribution of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the “impossible 
trinity,” or the “trilemma,” which states that a country may simultaneously choose any two, but 
not all, of the following three goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration. The trilemma is illustrated in Figure 1; each of the three sides – 
representing monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration – depicts 
a potentially desirable goal, yet it is not possible to be simultaneously on all three sides of the 
triangle. The top vertex – labeled “closed capital markets” – is associated with monetary policy 
autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime, but not financial integration, the preferred choice of 
most developing countries in the mid to late 1980s.
1
 
Over the last 20 years, most developing countries have opted for increasing financial 
integration. The trilemma implies that a country choosing this path must either forgo exchange 
rate stability if it wishes to preserve a degree of monetary independence, or forgo monetary 
independence if it wishes to preserve exchange rate stability.   
The purpose of this paper is to outline a methodology that will allow us to easily and 
intuitively characterize and assess the choices countries have made with respect to the trilemma 
during the post Bretton-Woods period. The first part of this paper introduces the “trilemma 
indexes,” that measures the extent of achievement in each of the three policy goals pertaining to 
the trilemma, namely monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. 
These indexes allow us to trace the evolving configurations of the international financial 
architecture. Second, using these indexes, we examine whether external shocks such as 
institutional changes in the international financial architecture (e.g., the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system) and large-scale financial crises (e.g., the Mexican debt crisis and the Asian 
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 See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005) for further discussion and references dealing with the trilemma. 
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financial crisis) have affected countries’ preferences over the three trilemma policy goals. Lastly, 
we examine whether the constraints based on the trilemma are binding. That is, using a simple 
linear specification that links the three trilemma indexes, we test whether the linear combination 
of the three indexes adds up to a constant. If this is found to be true, it indicates that the notion 
that countries can only pursue two out of the three policy goals is correct, and that a rise in one 
trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of the weighted sum of the other two. 
We begin by observing that over the last two decades, a growing number of developing 
countries have opted for hybrid exchange rate regimes – e.g., managed float buffered by 
increasing accumulation of international reserves [IR henceforth]. Despite the proliferation of 
greater exchange rate flexibility, IR/GDP ratios increased dramatically, especially in the wake of 
the East Asian crises. Practically all the increase in IR/GDP holding has taken place in emerging 
market countries [see Figure 2]. The magnitude of the changes during recent years is staggering: 
global reserves increased from about USD 1 trillion to more than USD 5 trillion between 1990 
and 2006 and to more than USD 10 trillion in 2011.  
The dramatic accumulation of international reserves has been uneven: while the IR/GDP 
ratio of industrial countries was relatively stable at approximately 6-8%, the IR/GDP ratio of 
developing countries increased from about 10% to about 25%. Today, about three quarters of the 
global international reserves are held by developing countries. Most of the accumulation has 
been in Asia, where reserves increased from about 10% in 1980 to about 34% in 2010 – still 33% 
in Asia after excluding China. The most dramatic changes occurred in China, increasing its 
IR/GDP ratio from about 1% in 1980, to about 48% in 2009 and 2010. In the mid-2000s, its IR 
holding surpassed that of other East Asian economies that had had an impressive amount of IR 
holding.  
 3 
Empirical studies suggest several structural changes in the patterns of reserves hoarding 
(Cheung and Ito, 2007; Obstfeld, et al. 2008). A drastic change occurred in the 1990s in terms of 
reserve management among developing countries. The IR/GDP ratios shifted upwards; the ratios 
increased dramatically immediately after the East Asian crisis of 1997-8, but subsided by 2000. 
Another structural change took place in the early 2000s, mostly driven by an unprecedented 
increase in the accumulation of international reserves by China. 
The globalization of financial markets is evident in the growing financial integration of 
all groups of countries. While the original framing of the trilemma was silent regarding the role 
of reserves, recent trends suggest that hoarding reserves may be closely related to changing 
patterns of the trilemma for developing countries. The earlier literature focused on the role of 
international reserves as a buffer stock critical to the management of an adjustable-peg or 
managed-floating exchange-rate regime.
2
 While useful, the buffer stock model has limited 
capacity to account for the recent development in international reserves hoarding – the greater 
flexibility of the exchange rates exhibited in recent decades should help reduce reserve 
accumulation, in contrast to the trends reported above.  
The recent literature has focused on the adverse side effects of deeper financial 
integration of developing countries – the increased exposure to volatile short-term inflows of 
capital (dubbed “hot money”), subject to frequent sudden stops and reversals (see Calvo, 1998). 
The empirical evidence suggests that international reserves can reduce both the probability of a 
sudden stop and the depth of the resulting output collapse when the sudden stop occurs.
3
  
Aizenman and Lee (2007) link the large increase in reserves holding to the deepening financial 
integration of developing countries and find evidence that international reserves hoarding serves 
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 Accordingly, optimal reserves balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves 
with the opportunity cost of holding reserves (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981).   
3
 See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), and Aizenman and Marion (2004) for papers 
viewing international reserves as output and consumption stabilizers. 
 4 
as a means of self-insurance against exposure to sudden stops. In extensive empirical analysis of 
the shifting determinants of international reserve holdings for more than 100 economies over the 
1975-2004 period, Cheung and Ito (2007) find that while trade openness is the only factor that is 
significant in most of the specifications and samples under consideration, its explanatory power 
has been declining over time. In contrast, the explanatory power of financial variables has been 
increasing over time.   
The increasing importance of financial integration as a determinant for international 
reserves hoarding suggests a link between the changing configurations of the trilemma and the 
level of international reserves. Indeed, Obstfeld, et al. (2008) find that the size of domestic 
financial liabilities that could potentially be converted into foreign currency (M2), financial 
openness, the ability to access foreign currency through debt markets, and exchange rate policy 
are all significant predictors of international reserve stocks. 
Holding an adequate amount of IR may allow an economy to achieve a target 
combination of exchange rate stability, monetary policy autonomy, and financial openness. For 
example, a country pursuing a stable exchange rate and monetary autonomy may try to liberalize 
cross-border financial transactions while determined not to give up the current levels of 
exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy. In such a case, the monetary authorities may try 
to hold a sizeable amount of IR so that they can stabilize the exchange rate movement while 
retaining monetary autonomy. Or, if an economy with open financial markets and fixed 
exchange rate faces a need to independently relax monetary policy, it may be able to do so, 
though temporarily, as long as it holds a massive amount of IR. Thus, evidently, one cannot 
discuss the issue of the trilemma without incorporating a role for IR holding. 
As an easy and intuitive way to summarize these trends, we illustrate “Diamond charts.” 
That is, we apply the methodology outlined in the next section and construct for each country a 
 5 
vector of trilemma and IR configurations that measures each country’s monetary independence, 
exchange rate stability, international reserves, and financial integration. These measures are 
normalized between zero and one. Each country’s configuration at a given instant is summarized 
by a “generalized diamond,” whose four vertices measure the three trilemma dimensions and IR 
holding (as a ratio to GDP). These diamond charts allow us to compare combinations of the four 
policy goals and their historical development among different country groups. 
A key message of the trilemma is instrument scarcity – policy makers face a tradeoff, 
where increasing one trilemma variable (such as higher financial integration) would induce a 
drop in the weighted average of the other two variables (lower exchange rate stability, or lower 
monetary independence, or a combination of the two). Yet, to our knowledge, the validity of this 
tradeoff among the three trilemma variables has not been tested properly. A possible concern is 
that the trilemma framework does not impose an exact functional restriction on the association 
between the three trilemma policy variables.  
We close the paper by applying a regression analysis to test the validity of the simplest 
functional specification for the trilemma: whether the three trilemma policy goals are linearly 
related. It is important to note that the trilemma predictions are not a mathematical tautology, and 
are testable.  Specifically, a linear version of the Trilemma predicts that each of the trilemma 
coefficients is positive [such that a rise in one variable should be traded off with a drop in the 
weighted sum of the other two], and that the explanatory power of the equation is high 
enough that higher order terms are insignificant.  Of independent interest is the R
2
, accounting 
what portion of the variability is explainable, and the stability of the equation. For this purpose, 
we examine and validate that the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to 
a constant while the three trilemma weights are positive so that we can confirm the notion that a 
 6 
rise in one trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of a linear weighted sum of the 
other two trilemma variables.  
Section 2 outlines the methodology for the construction of our “trilemma indexes” that 
measure the extent of achievement in the three policy goals. This section also presents summary 
statistics of the indexes and examines whether the indexes entail any structural breaks 
corresponding to major global economic events. Section 3 tests the validity of a linear 
specification of the trilemma indexes to examine whether the notion of the trilemma can be 
considered to be a trade-off and binding. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Measures of the Trilemma Dimensions 
The empirical analysis of the tradeoffs being made requires measures of the policies. 
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of good measures; in this paper we remedy this deficiency by 
creating several policy metrics. 
 
2.1 Construction of the Trilemma Measures 
Monetary Independence (MI) 
The extent of monetary independence is measured as the reciprocal of the annual 
correlation of the monthly interest rates between the home country and the base country. Money 
market rates are used.
4
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 The data are extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (60B..ZF...). For the countries whose 
money market rates are unavailable or extremely limited, the money market data are supplemented by those from 
the Bloomberg terminal and also by the discount rates (60...ZF...) and the deposit rates (60L..ZF...) series from IFS. 
 7 
where i refers to home countries and j to the base country. By construction, the maximum and 




 Here, the base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is 
most closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. For the countries and 
years for which Shambaugh’s data are available, the base countries from his work are used, and 
for the others, the base countries are assigned based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and the CIA Factbook. 
 
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
 To measure exchange rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange 
rate between the home country and the base country are calculated and included in the following 






   
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 The index is smoothed out by applying the three-year moving averages encompassing the preceding, concurrent, 
and following years (t – 1, t, t+1) of observations. 
6
 We note one important caveat about this index. For some countries and some years, especially early in the sample, 
the interest rate used for the calculation of the MI index is often constant throughout a year, making the annual 
correlation of the interest rates between the home and base countries (corr(ii, ij) in the formula) undefined. Since we 
treat the undefined corr the same as zero, it makes the MI index value 0.5. One might think that the policy interest 
rate being constant (regardless of the base country's interest rate) is a sign of monetary independence. However, it 
could reflect the possibility that the home country uses other tools to implement monetary policy, rather than 
manipulating the interest rates (e.g., manipulation of required reserve ratios and providing window guidance; or 
financial repression). To complicate matters, some countries have used reserves manipulation and financial 
repression to gain monetary independence while others have used both while strictly following the base country's 
monetary policy. The bottom line is that it is impossible to fully account for these issues in the calculation of MI. 
Therefore, assigning an MI value of 0.5 for such a case appears to be a reasonable compromise. However, we also 
undertake robustness checks on the index. 
 8 
Merely applying this formula can easily create a downward bias in the index, that is, it would 
exaggerate the “flexibility” of the exchange rate especially when the rate usually follows a 
narrow band, but is de- or revalued infrequently.
7
 To avoid such downward bias, we also apply a 
threshold to the exchange rate movement as has been done in the literature. That is, if the rate of 
monthly change in the exchange rate stayed within +/-0.33 percent bands, we consider the 
exchange rate is “fixed” and assign the value of one for the ERS index. Furthermore, single year 
pegs are dropped because they are quite possibly not intentional ones.
8
 Higher values of this 





Financial Openness/Integration (KAOPEN) 
Without question, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account 
controls.
9
 Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of capital account 
controls, it is generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-
world capital controls. Nonetheless, for the measure of financial openness, we use the index of 
capital account openness, or KAOPEN, by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). KAOPEN is based on 
information regarding restrictions in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, KAOPEN is the first standardized principal 
component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
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 In such a case, the average of the monthly change in the exchange rate would be so small that even small changes 
could make the standard deviation big and thereby the ERS value small.  
8
  The choice of the +/-0.33 percent bands is based on the +/-2% band based on the annual rate, that is often used in 
the literature. Also, to prevent breaks in the peg status due to one-time realignments, any exchange rate that had a 
percentage change of zero in eleven out of twelve months is considered fixed. When there are two re/devaluations in 
three months, then they are considered to be one re/devaluation event, and if the remaining 10 months experience no 
exchange rate movement, then that year is considered to be the year of fixed exchange rate. This way of defining the 
threshold for the exchange rate is in line with the one adopted by Shambaugh (2004). 
9
  See Chinn and Ito (2008), Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002), and Kose et al. 
(2006) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions.  
 9 
current account transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of the 
surrender of export proceeds.
10
 Since KAOPEN is based upon reported restrictions, it is 
necessarily a de jure index of capital account openness (in contrast to de facto measures such as 
those in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)). The choice of a de jure measure of capital account 
openness is driven by the motivation to look into policy intentions of the countries; de facto 
measures are more susceptible to other macroeconomic effects than solely policy decisions with 
respect to capital controls.
11
  
The Chinn-Ito index is normalized between zero and one. Higher values of this index 
indicate that a country is more open to cross-border capital transactions.  
The dataset covers 184 countries, but data availability is uneven among the three 
indexes.
12
 Both MI and ERS start in 1960 whereas KAOPEN in 1970. All three indexes end in 
2010. The data set we examine does not include the United States, since we believe the U.S. is 
the “Nth country” which is not subject to the constraints of the trilemma. The Appendix presents 
data availability in more details. 
 
2.2 Tracking the Indexes  
Variations across Country Groupings 
 Comparing these indexes provides some interesting insights into how the international 
financial architecture has evolved over time. For this purpose, the “diamond charts” are most 
useful. Figure 3 summarizes the trends for industrialized countries, those excluding the 
“original” euro countries but including Germany, emerging market countries, and non-emerging 
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 This index is described in greater detail in Chinn and Ito (2008).  
11
 De jure measures of financial openness also face their own limitations. As Edwards (1999) discusses, it is often 
the case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory 
capital controls. Also, IMF-based variables are too aggregated to capture the subtleties of actual capital controls, that 
is, the direction of capital flows (i.e., inflows or outflows) as well as the type of financial transactions targeted.  
12




 Each country’s configuration at a given instant is summarized by 
a “generalized diamond,” whose four vertices measure monetary independence, exchange rate 
stability, IR/GDP ratio, and financial integration. The origin has been normalized so as to 




Panels of figures reveal that, over time, industrialized countries and emerging market 
countries have moved towards deeper financial integration while non-emerging market 
developing countries have only inched toward financial integration. While pursuing greater 
financial openness, industrialized countries have lost monetary independence, as have emerging 
market countries but to a much smaller extent. Emerging market countries, after giving up some 
exchange rate stability during the 1970s, have not changed their stance on the exchange rate 
stability at an intermediate level whereas non-emerging market developing countries seem to be 
remaining at, or slightly oscillating around, a relatively high level of exchange rate stability. 
Interestingly, emerging market countries stand out from other groups by achieving a relatively 
balanced combination of the three macroeconomic goals by the 2000s, i.e., middle-range levels 
of exchange rate stability and financial integration while not losing as much of monetary 
independently as industrialized countries. The recent policy combination has been matched by a 
substantial increase in IR/GDP at a level that is not observed in any other groups.  
 Figure 4 compares developing countries across different geographical groups. Latin 
American (LATAM) emerging market countries and countries in Asia, both developing and 
emerging market ones, have moved somewhat toward exchange rate flexibility in the 1970s, 
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 The “original” euro countries include Austria, Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Finland, Ireland, Spain, 
and Portugal. The emerging market countries are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier 
during the period of 1980-1997 by the International Finance Corporation, plus Hong Kong and Singapore.  
14
 The vertices of the diamond charts by no means correspond to the vertices of the trilemma triangle shown in 
Figure 1. While each “side” of the trilemma triangle represents the highest degree of attainment in one of the three 
policy choices, in the diamond charts, the vertices of the three measures correspond to the degree of attainment. 
 11 
though non-emerging market LATAM countries seem to have retained high levels of exchange 
rate stability. LATAM countries have rapidly increased financial openness although Asian 
emerging market economies have retained a stable level of financial openness through the 
sample period. One distinctive characteristic of the group of Asian emerging market economies 
is that it holds much more international reserves than any other group. More importantly, Asian 
emerging market countries have achieved a balanced combination of the three policy goals while 
the other groups have not, which can easily make one suspect it is the high volume of IR holding 
that may have allowed this group of countries to achieve such a trilemma configuration. We will 
revisit this issue later on.  
 
Patterns in a Balanced Panel 
Figure 5 again presents the development of trilemma indexes for different subsamples 
while focusing on the time dimension of the development of the indexes, but also restricts the 
entire sample to include only the countries for which all three indexes are available for the entire 
time period. By balancing the dataset, the number of countries included in the sample declines to 
60 countries, of which 41 are developing countries (22 of which are in turn emerging market 
countries). Each panel presents the full sample (i.e., cross-country) average of the trilemma index 
of concern and also its one-standard deviation band.  
There is a striking differences between industrialized and developing countries. The top-
left panel shows that, between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the levels of monetary 
independence in industrialized and developing countries were close together. However, since the 
early 1990s, these two groups have been diverging from each other. While developing countries 
have been hovering around intermediate levels of monetary independence, industrialized 
countries have steadily become much less independent in terms of monetary policy, and moved 
 12 




In the case of the exchange rate stability index, after the breakup of the Bretton Woods 
system, industrialized countries significantly reduced the extent of exchange rate stability until 
the early 1980s. After the 1980s, these countries gradually, but steadily increased the extent of 
exchange rate stability to the present – though they experienced some intermittent in the early 
1990s due to the EMS crisis.
16
 Developing countries, on the other hand, maintained relatively 
high levels of exchange rate stability until the 1980s. Although these countries seem to have 
adopted some exchange rate flexibility in the early 1980s, they have since maintained constant 
levels of exchange rate stability, though slightly trending upward since the beginning of the 
1990s, through the mid-2000s, which seems to reflect the “fear of floating.” In the last ten years, 
the exchange rate stability index of developing countries has been tracing very closely that of 
developed economies. In the last few years, both groups of countries decreased the level of 
exchange rate stability somewhat discretely, possibly reflecting the impact of the global financial 
crisis of 2008-09.  
Not surprisingly, industrialized countries have achieved higher levels of financial 
openness throughout the period. The acceleration of financial openness in the mid-1990s 
remained significantly high when compared to the cross-country average of both the full sample 
and LDC subsample. On the other hand, developing countries also accelerated financial openness 
in the early 1990s after some retrenchment during the 1980s. Overall, LDC countries have been 
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 When the euro countries are removed from the IDC sample, the extent of the divergence from the average 
becomes less marked although there is still a tendency among the non-euro countries to move toward lower levels of 
monetary independence. 
16
 The ERS index for the non-euro industrialized countries, persistently hovers around the value of .40 throughout 
the time period after rapidly dropping in the early 1970s. 
 13 
in parallel with the global trend of financial liberalization throughout the sample period, but the 
difference from the industrialized countries has been moderately rising in the last decade. 
Broadly speaking, the difference between emerging market countries and non-emerging 
market developing countries is smaller than that between IDC and LDC subsamples (shown in 
the bottom row of Figure 5), but comparison between the two groups still yields interesting 
insights. After the beginning of the 1990s, EMG and non-EMG countries seem to have started 
behaving differently in terms of how much monetary independence to retain. While EMG 
countries retained higher levels of monetary independence than non-EMG countries for most of 
the 1990s, EMG countries tended to have less monetary independence since the late 1990s, 
though they are more independent than non-EMG countries for the last few years of the sample. 
As for exchange rate stability, EMG countries are persistently more flexible than non-emerging 
ones since 1980 and the difference is wider since the early 1990s. EMG countries have also 
become more financially open compared to non-EMG countries since the mid-1990s. The faster 
trend of financial liberalization among EMG countries is, however, not matched with a discrete 
decrease in either monetary independence or exchange rate stability, suggesting that policy 
alterations are not taking place in a discrete fashion as was the case with industrialized countries 
in the last 15 years. 
Figure 6 shows the development paths of these indexes altogether, making the differences 
between IDCs and LDCs and those between EMGs and non-EMGs appear more clearly.
17
 For 
the industrialized countries, financial openness accelerated after the beginning of the 1990s and 
exchange rate stability rose after the end of the 1990s. The extent of monetary independence has 
experienced a declining trend, especially after the early 1990s, all reflecting the introduction of 
the euro in 1999. 
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 We continue to use the balanced dataset. 
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Again, developing countries differ not only from industrialized ones, but also between 
emerging and non-emerging market developing ones. For emerging market countries, up to the 
mid-1980s, exchange rate stability was the most pervasive policy among the three, though it has 
been on a declining trend since the early 1970s, followed by monetary independence that has 
been relatively constant during the period. Between the mid-1980s and 2000, monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability became the most pursued policies while the level of 
financial openness kept rising rapidly in the 1990s. Most interestingly, toward the end of the 
1990s, all three indexes converged to the middle ground with the rapid raise in financial 
openness, which we have already observed as the balanced achievement of the three policy goals 
in Figure 4. This result suggests that developing countries may have been trying to cling to 
moderate levels of both monetary independence and financial openness while maintaining higher 
levels of exchange rate stability. This trend is essentially leaning against the trilemma in other 
words, possibly putting much stress on the open macro policies adopted by this group of 
countries. Above all, this trend of convergence to the middle ground may explain why some of 
these economies hold sizable international reserves, potentially to buffer the stress arising from 
the trilemma. Willett (2003) has called this compulsion by countries with a mediocre level of 
exchange rate fixity to hoard reserves the “unstable middle” hypothesis (as opposed to the 
“disappearing middle” view).   
None of these observations are applicable to non-emerging developing market countries. 
For this group of countries, exchange rate stability has been the most pervasive policy 
throughout the period, though there is some variation, followed by monetary independence. 
There is no discernible trend in financial openness for this subsample.   
 
2.3. Identifying Structural Breaks 
 15 
 To shed more light on the evolution of the index values, we investigate whether major 
international economic events have been associated with structural breaks in the index series. We 
conjecture that major events – such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (indicating the beginning of 1980’s debt crises of developing 
countries), and the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 (the onset of sudden stop crises affecting high-
performing Asian economies (HPAEs), Russia and other emerging countries) – may have 
affected economies in such significant ways that they opted to alter their policy choices.  
 We identify the years of 1973, 1982, and 1997-98 as candidate structural breaks, and test 
the equality of the group mean of the indexes over the candidate break points for each of the 
subsample groups and periods.
18
 The results are reported in Table 1 (a). The first and second 
columns of the top panel indicate that after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the 
mean of the exchange rate stability index for the industrialized country group fell, statistically 
significantly, from 0.71 to 0.43, while the mean of financial openness slightly, but statistically 
significantly, increase from 0.43 to 0.47. Non-emerging market developing countries, on the 
other hand, did increase the level of fixity of their exchange rates over the same time period 
while they became less monetarily independent and more financially open. Although emerging 
market economies reduced the level of monetary independence, they did also move toward more 
flexible exchange rates while not changing the extent of financial openness.  
Even after the Mexican debt crisis, industrialized countries slightly, but significantly 
increased the level of exchange rate stability and significantly increased the level of financial 
openness, while holding constant the level of monetary independence. In contrast, the debt crisis 
led all developing countries to pursue further exchange rate flexibility, most likely reflecting the 
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 The data for the candidate structural break years are not included in the group means either for pre- or post-
structural break years. For the Asian crisis, we assume the years of 1997 and 1998 are the break years and therefore 
remove observations for these two years. 
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fact that crisis countries could not sustain fixed exchange rate arrangements. However, these 
countries also simultaneously pursued slightly more monetary independence. Interestingly, non-
emerging developing market countries tightened capital controls as a result of the debt crisis 
while emerging market countries did not follow suit.   
The trilemma indexes seems to have changed their nature around the time of the Asian 
crisis in 1997-98. The level of industrialized countries’ monetary independence dropped 
significantly while their exchange rates became much more stable and their efforts of capital 
account liberalization continued, all reflecting the European countries’ movement toward 
economic and monetary union. Non-emerging market developing countries on the other hand 
increased the level of all three indexes. Emerging market countries also started liberalizing 
financial markets, though much more significantly, though they lost monetary independence and 
slightly gained exchange rate stability.  
Several other major events can also be candidates for inducing structural breaks identified. 
For example, anecdotal accounts date globalization at the beginning of the 1990s, when many 
developing countries began to liberalize financial markets. Also, China’s entry to the World 
Trade Organization in 2001 was, in retrospect, the beginning of the country’s rise as the world’s 
manufacturer. Because the effect of these events may have often been conflated with that of the 
Asian crisis we also test whether the years of 1990 and 2001 can be structural breaks by 
conducting the same mean-equality tests (results not reported).  
Armed with the mean equality test results for different candidate structural breaks, we 
can now compare the t-statistics across the different structural breaks for each of the indexes and 
subsamples. Given that the balanced dataset is used in this exercise, the largest t-statistics should 
indicate the most significant structural break for each of the index series for each subsample.  
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Table 1 (b) reports the most significant structural break for each of the subsamples and 
the indexes. For the group of industrialized countries, industrial countries’ monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability series have the largest t-statistics when the structural 
break of 1997-98 is tested. For financial openness, however, the year of 1990 is identified with 
the most significant structural break.
19
 For the group of non-emerging market developing 
countries, the structural break of 1990 is the most significant for financial openness while it is 
the years of 2001 and 1973 for exchange rate stability and monetary independence, respectively. 
For emerging market countries, however, the most significant structural break is found to have 
occurred in 2001 for monetary independence, in 1982 for exchange rate stability, and in 1997-98 
for financial openness. 
 
3 Theoretical Validity of the Trilemma Indexes 
3.1 Linearity among the Trilemma Indexes 
 While the preceding analyses are quite informative on the evolution of international 
macroeconomic policy orientation, we have not shown whether these three macroeconomic 
policy goals are “binding” in the context of the impossible trinity. That is, it is important for us to 
confirm that countries have faced the trade-offs based on the trilemma. A challenge facing a full 
test of the trilemma tradeoff is that the trilemma framework does not impose any obvious 
functional form on the nature of the tradeoffs between the three trilemma variables. To illustrate 
this concern, we note that the instrument scarcity associated with the trilemma implies that 
                                                 
19
 The finding that both monetary independence and exchange rate stability entail structural breaks around the Asian 
crisis can be driven merely by the countries that adopted the euro in 1999. We repeat the same exercise using the 
industrial countries sample without the euro countries, and find that the structural breaks for monetary independence 
and financial opens remain the same as in the full IDC sample (1997-98 and 1990, respectively), but that the 
exchange rate stability series is found to have a structural break in 1973, the year when the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed.  
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increasing one trilemma variable, say higher financial integration, should induce lower exchange 
rate stability, or lower monetary independence, or a combination of these two policy adjustments.  
Theory does not provide any specific functional form to express the relationships 
between the three policy goals. However, using the trilemma triangle of Figure 1 and the 
trilemma indexes we have used, we can conceptualize the linear hypothesis of the trilemma by 
placing a simplex on a plane in a third-dimensional domain constructed by the three indexes (as 
the axes). A combination of the three policy goals may be expressed as a point within or on (one 
of the three vertexes or sides of) the simplex whose coordinates are determined by the three 
indexes. 
That means a trilemma linear version implies that the weighted sum of the three trilemma 
policy variables adds up to a constant.   In which case, a rise in one of the three trilemma 
variables leads to a drop in the weighted sum of the other two – corresponding to a move from 
one point to another within or on the generalized triangle. Hence, we can test the validity of the 
trilemma hypothesis using a simple linear functional form such as equation (1): 
t ++=1 i,tji,tji,tj KAOPENcERSbMIa    (1) 
where j can be either IDC, ERM, or LDC.            
Because we have shown that different subsample groups of countries have experienced different 
development paths, we allow the coefficients on all the variables to vary across different groups 
of countries – industrialized countries, the countries that have been in the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM), and developing countries – allowing for interactions between the 
explanatory variables and the dummies for these subsamples.
20
 The regression is run for the full 
sample period as well as the subsample periods identified in the preceding subsection.  
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 The dummy for ERM countries is assigned for the countries and years that corresponds to participation in the 
ERM (i.e., Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg from 1979 on; Spain from 1989; U.K. only 
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 The rationale behind this exercise is that policy makers of an economy must choose a 
weighted average of the three policies in order to achieve a best combination of the two. Hence, 
if we can find the goodness of fit for the above regression model is high, it would suggest a 
linear specification is rich enough to explain the trade-off among the three policy dimensions. In 
other words, the lower the goodness of fit, the weaker the support for the existence of the trade-
off, suggesting either that the theory of the trilemma is wrong, or that the relationship is non-
linear. 
Secondly, the estimated coefficients in the above regression model should give us some 
approximate estimates of the weights countries put on the three policy goals. However, the 
estimated coefficients alone will not provide sufficient information about “how much of” the 
policy choice countries have actually implemented. Hence, looking into the predictions using the 
estimated coefficients and the actual values for the variables (such as MIâ , ERSb̂ , and 
KAOPENĉ ) will be more informative. 
Thirdly, by comparing the predicted values based on the above regression, i.e., 
KAOPENcERSbMIa ˆˆˆ  , over a time horizon, we can get some inferences about how 
“binding” the trilemma is. If the trilemma is found to be linear, the predicted values should hover 
around the value of 1, and the prediction errors should indicate how much of the three policy 
choices have been “not fully used” or to what extent the trilemma is “not binding.”
21
 
Table 2 presents the regression results. The results from the regression with the full 
sample data are reported in the first column, and the others for different subsample periods are in 
                                                                                                                                                             
for 1990-91; Portugal from 1992; Austria from 1995; Finland from 1996; and Denmark and Greece from 1999) or 
ERM II (Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia from 2004; and Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, and Slovak Rep. from 2005).  
21
 If the trilemma is not binding, i.e., the predicted value based on equation (1) is below the value of one, such a 
policy combination can be shown as a point within the space between the origin and the triangle plain. A policy 
combination that yields the prediction above the value of 1 would be located somewhere “outside” the triangle (from 




 First of all, the adjusted R-squared for the full sample model as well as 
for the subsample periods is found to be above 95%, which indicates that the three policy goals 
are linearly related to each other and add up to a constant. Hence, we have evidence that 
countries face the trade-off among the three policy options. Across different time periods, the 
estimated coefficients vary, suggesting that countries alter over time the weights on the three 
policy goals.  
Figure 7 illustrates the goodness of fit from a different angle. In the top panels, the solid 
lines show the means of the predicted values (i.e., KAOPENcERSbMIa ˆˆˆ  ) based on the full 
sample model in the first column of Table 2 for the groups of industrial countries (left) and 
developing countries (right).
23
 To incorporate the time variation of the predictions, the subsample 
mean of the prediction values as well as their 95% confidence intervals (that are shown as the 
shaded areas) are calculated using five-year rolling windows.
 24
 The panels also display the 
rolling means of the predictions using the coefficients and actual values of only two of the three 
trilemma terms – ERSbMIa ˆˆ   (gray solid line), KAOPENcMIa ˆˆ   (black dashed line), 
KAOPENcERSb ˆˆ   (gray dashed line). The regression results allow a simple description of the 
changing ranking of policy combinations (of the two out of the three trilemma policy goals) 
overtime.   
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 The fact that all three indexes involve structural breaks, as was shown in the previous section, it is possible for the 
estimated coefficients from the full sample estimation to entail coefficient instability.  
23
 For this exercise, predictions also incorporate the interactions with the dummy variables shown in Table 2.  
24
 Both the mean and the standard errors of the predicted values are calculated using the rolling five-year windows. 














































, respectively, where n refers to the number of countries in a subsample (i.e., IDC and 
LDC), itx̂  to the prediction values, and 4| ttx  to the mean of itx̂  in the rolling five-year window.  
Because of the use of rolling five-year windows, the lines in the figures only start in 1974. 
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From these panels of figures, we can first see that the predicted values based on the 
model hover around the value of one closely for both subsamples. For the group of industrial 
countries, the prediction average is statistically below the value of one in the late 1970s through 
the beginning of the 1990s. However, since then, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
mean of the prediction values is one, indicating that the trilemma is “binding” for industrialized 
countries. For developing countries, the model is under-predicting from the end of the 1970s 
through the late 1990s. However, unlike the IDC group, the mean of the predictions becomes 
statistically smaller than one in the early 2000s and goes back to around the value of one in the 
last few years of the sample period. More importantly, for both subsamples, the mean of the 
predictions never rises above the value of one in statistical sense, implying not only that the three 
macroeconomic policies are linearly related with each other, but also that countries have never 
implemented an infeasible combination of policies. 
 
3.2 Development of Policy Preferences 
The top panels also show that, among industrialized countries, the policy combination of 
increasing exchange rate stability and more financial openness rapidly became prevalent after the 
beginning of the 2000s. Among developing countries, the policy combinations of monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability has been quite dominant throughout the sample period 
while the policy combination of exchange rate stability and financial openness has been the least 
prevalent over, most probably reflecting the bitter experiences of currency crises. 
 In the lower panels, we can observe the contributions of each policy orientation (i.e., 
MIâ , ERSb̂ , and KAOPENĉ ) for the IDC and LDC groups.
25
 While less developed countries 
maintained high, though fluctuating, levels of monetary independence, both exchange rate 
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 They are again the means based on five-year rolling windows. 
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stability and financial integration remained at much lower levels throughout the period with the 
latter slightly increasing. In the last decade or so, while monetary independence is on a declining 
trend, the gap between the predictions based on exchange rate stability and financial openness 
has been shrinking somewhat. For the EMG group (not reported), exchange rate stability has 
been in a moderately declining trend since the 1980s while financial openness has been in a 
moderately rising trend since the 1990s. This may indicate that more countries tend to try to 
achieve certain levels of exchange rate stability and financial openness together while 
maintaining high levels of monetary independence. This kind of effort can be done only when 
the countries accumulate high levels of international reserves that allow them to intervene in 
foreign exchange markets, consistent with the fact that many developing countries increased 
international reserves in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. However, as the concept of 
the trilemma predicts, this sort of environment must involve a rise in the costs of sterilized 
intervention especially when the actual volume of cross-border transactions of financial assets 
increase and when there is no reversal in the three policies.
26
  
The experience of the industrialized countries casts a stark contrast. Although monetary 
independence was also IDC’s top priority until the early 1990s, it yielded to financial integration 
in the late 1990s and to exchange rate stability in the early 2000s, continuing to fall to become 
the lowest priority in the 2000s. Such changes in the relative weights of the three policy goals do 
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 Refer to Aizenman and Glick (2008) and Glick and Hutchison (2009) for more analysis on the limit of sterilized 
interventions. Aizenman, et al. (2010) show that if a country pursues greater exchange rate stability while holding a 
massive volume of international reserves, it would experience higher levels of inflation, indicating the limit in the 
efforts of fully sterilizing foreign exchange intervention to maintain exchange rate stability. 
27
 We also repeat the exercise using the regression models (whose results shown in Table 2) for each of the 
subsample period (excluding the break years). The results (not reported) are qualitatively the same as in Figure 7. 
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3.3 Robustness Checks 
3.3.1 Different Estimation Specifications 
One may question the uniqueness of this regression exercise since our estimation model 
has an identity scalar as the dependent variable. As a robustness check, we ran a regression of 
MIi,t on ERSi,t and KAOPENi,t. Using the estimated coefficients for ERS and KAOPEN, we 
recover the estimates for aj, bj, and cj in equation (1), and recreate panels of figures comparable 
to those in Figure 7. These alternative figures appear to be very much comparable to Figure 7 
(not reported) and therefore confirm our conclusions about the linearity of the trilemma indexes 
as well as the development of the subsample mean of prediction values based on equation (1). 
Showing the linearity of the three trilemma indexes using a pooled panel estimation 
method as we did previously may be misleading. That is, a rise in one index for one country can 
involve a fall in the weighted sum of the other two for another country, which can still be 
captured as a linear relationship among the three indexes in a panel context. Hence, we test the 
linearity of the three indexes for each of our sample countries (with balanced data). The results 
confirm our prior findings. Among the countries tested, the smallest adjusted R-squared is 89%, 
followed by the second smallest adjusted R-squared of 92%. The mean adjusted R-squared is 
97%, and more than 90% of the sample countries have the adjusted R-squared over 95%. These 
findings reconfirm that the three indexes are linearly related with each other. 
Although all three indexes range between zero and one, it is possible that these indexes 
are not stationary, in which case estimation results could be spurious. However, even if the 
indexes are non-stationary, if one could show that they are cointegrated, the linearity of the 
indexes still holds. Although our primary purpose is not to show any specific long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the three indexes, we conduct cointegration tests for each of the 
sample countries to show the linearity of the three indexes. More specifically, following 
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Johansen’s (1991) method, we find the rank of the cointegration relationship among MI, ERS, 
and KAOPEN by conducting multiple trace tests.
28
 In this analysis, the rank refers to the number 
of cointegration equations when the three indexes are shown in a vector error correction (VECM) 
specification. Given that we have three variables to test the cointegration of, the rank of three 
would mean that all three indexes for that particular country are stationary. The rank of either 
one or two would mean the indexes are linearly related while the rank of zero means there is no 
linear relationship among the three indexes. 
When we apply this cointegration test to each of the sample countries in the balanced 
dataset, 13 out of 60 countries (or 22%) are found to have the rank of three, meaning that all the 
indexes are stationary for these countries, for which the previous simple linear analysis is 
sufficient. 29 countries, or 48%, of the sample are found to have either one linear relationship 
(23 countries) or two linear relationships (6 countries).
29
 For eighteen countries, or 30% of the 
sample, the three indexes are not cointegrated. If we use information criteria to determine the 
number of cointegration equations, the proportion of no cointegration drops. When the Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion is used, 45 countries out of 60 yield one or two cointegration 
ranks (i.e., 25% of the sample countries have no cointegration), whereas the Hannan and Quinn 
information criterion yields 8 countries (13%) having no cointegration relationship.  
At the very least, we can safely conclude that the trilemma indexes are linearly related as 
theory predicts. 
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 Since our primary focus is not an intensive time series analysis, we systematically implement this analysis for 
each of our sample countries while assuming the lag length to be 2. 
29
 Given the nature of the indexes, it is possible that one or some of the three indexes do not change values at all for 
some time period, which creates the issue of (perfect) multicollearity among the indexes and which therefore makes 
it impossible for the cointegration test to be executed using all the three indexes. In such a case, we would remove 
the variable that is apparently causing the multicollearity and apply the cointegration test to the remaining two 
variables. Or, we would apply the cointegration test (while using all three indexes) only to the period when there 
appears to be no multicollearity if multicollearity is an issue in a short period.  
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3.3.2 Revisit of the Role of International Reserves Holding 
As we have already discussed, international reserves holding has been increasing its 
importance in the financially globalized world. Given the rapid increase in the IR holding 
especially among developing economies, it may be necessary to think about the relationship 
among the three trilemma policy goals in the terms of not just the trilemma, but the quadrilemma 
(See Aizenman, 2011 and Aizenman and Ito, 2012).
30
  
That said, Table 3 reports the estimation results when a variable for IR holding (as a 
share of GDP), along with its interactions with the LDC and ERM dummies, is included in the 
estimation based on equation (1). Several findings must be noted. First, including the variable for 
IR holding barely improves the goodness of fit of the estimations. The adjusted R-squared for the 
full sample goes up only by one percentage point (from 95% to 96%). The same observation is 
also applicable to other estimations for the subsample periods. Second, the coefficient on the IR 
holding variable is significant for the subsample periods that start in 1983 or later, suggesting 
that the role of IR holding is important in the context of the trilemma, but after the 1980s. Third, 
the role of IR holding in the trilemma seems to be more limited among developing countries – 
when the LDC subgroup has a significantly different coefficient on IR holding than 
industrialized countries, the magnitude of the coefficient is usually smaller than that of 
industrialized countries.  
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 Aizenman, et al. (2010) empirically show that pursuing greater exchange stability can be increasing output 
volatility for developing economies, but that that can be mitigated by holding a greater amount of international 
reserves than the threshold of about 20% of GDP. Aizenman, et al. (2011) find that Asian emerging market 
economies seem to have adopted a policy combination of the three trilemma policies and international reserves that 
allow these economies to lessen output volatility through reduced real exchange volatility. Aizenman and Ito (2012) 
show that in the last two decades, emerging market economies with relatively low levels of IR holdings have 
experienced higher levels of output volatility when they chose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy 
divergence while this output volatility effect did not apply to economies with relatively high international reserves 
holdings, suggesting that high levels of IR holding may allow countries to choose a policy combination from a wider 
range of spectrum of policy combinations. 
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These findings indicate that the linearity does exist primarily for the original three policy 
variables under the trilemma, i.e., monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial 
openness. Despite the increasing importance of IR holding, the role of IR holding in the linear 
relationship among the trilemma policy goals is limited. It may be possible that the role of IR 
holding in the context of the trilemma is increasing in the last two decades of financial 
globalization, but scrutinizing the changing role of IR holding is outside the scope of this paper.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, we have described a methodology to trace the changing patterns in the 
configurations of the trilemma that have taken shape. Our methodology reveals the striking 
differences in the choices that industrialized and developing countries have made over the 1970-
2010 period.  The recent trend suggests that among emerging market countries, the three 
dimensions of the trilemma configurations: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and 
financial openness, are converging towards a “middle ground” with managed exchange rate 
flexibility, which they attempted to buffer by holding sizable international reserves, while 
maintaining medium levels of monetary independence and financial integration. Industrialized 
countries, on the other hand, have been experiencing divergence of the three dimensions of the 
trilemma and moved toward the configuration of high exchange rate stability and financial 
openness and low monetary independence as most distinctively exemplified by the euro 
countries’ experience. 
The system has evolved over time, it would be a mistake to think of the process as being 
smooth and continuous. Rather, there have been a number of discrete, structural breaks 
associated with significant events: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the debt crisis of 
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1982, and the Asian crisis of 1997-98. For both industrialized and developing countries, the 
major events in the last decade, such as the emergence of rapid globalization and the rise of 
China, have also impacted the policy arrangements significantly. With these results, we can 
safely expect that the present turbulence in the global financial markets could challenge the 
stability of the current trilemma configuration. 
We also tested whether the three macroeconomic policy goals are “binding” in the 
context of the impossible trinity. That is, we attempted to provide evidence that countries have 
faced the trade-offs based on the trilemma. Because there is no specific functional form of the 
trade-offs or the linkage of these three policy goals, we tested a simplest linear specification for 
the three trilemma indexes and examined whether the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy 
variables adds up to a constant. Our results confirmed that countries do face the binding trilemma. 
That is, a change in one of the trilemma variables would induce a change with the opposite sign 
in the weighted average of the other two. In that sense, we have provided substantial content to 
the hypothesis of the “impossible trinity.” 
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1 512 Afghanistan U.S. –  1961-2010 1970-2010 
2 914 Albania U.S. 1992-2010 1992-2010 1995-2010 
3 612 Algeria France 1974-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
4 614 Angola U.S. 1995-2010 1961-2010 1993-2010 
5 311 Antigua and Barbuda U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1985-2009 
6 213 Argentina (E) U.S. 1977-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
7 911 Armenia U.S. 1995-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
8 314 Aruba U.S. 1986-2010 1986-2010 1992-2010 
9 193 Australia U.S. 1969-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
10 122 Austria Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
11 912 Azerbaijan U.S. 1993-2010 1995-2010 1996-2010 
12 313 Bahamas, The U.S. 1970-2010 1961-2010 1977-2010 
13 419 Bahrain U.S. 1975-2010 1966-2010 1976-2010 
14 513 Bangladesh (E) U.S. 1972-2010 1972-2010 1976-2010 
15 316 Barbados 1960-74 U.K.; 1975-U.S. 1967-2010 1961-2010 1974-2010 
16 913 Belarus U.S. 1993-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
17 124 Belgium Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
18 339 Belize U.S. 1979-2010 1961-2010 1985-2010 
19 638 Benin France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1979-2010 
20 514 Bhutan India 1982-2007 1961-2010 1985-2010 
21 218 Bolivia U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
22 616 Botswana (E) S. Africa 1976-2010 1961-2010 1972-2010 
23 223 Brazil (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1964-2010 1970-2010 
24 516 Brunei U.S. 2003-2010 1961-2010 - 
25 918 Bulgaria (E) Germany 1991-2010 1961-2010 1994-2010 
26 748 Burkina Faso France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1988-2010 
27 618 Burundi 1960-70 Belgium; 1971-U.S. 1977-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
28 662 Côte d'Ivoire (E) France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
29 522 Cambodia U.S. 1994-2010 1961-2010 1973-2010 
30 622 Cameroon France 1968-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
31 156 Canada U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
32 624 Cape Verde Germany 1985-2010 1961-2010 1982-2010 
33 626 Central African Rep. France 1968-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
34 628 Chad France 1968-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
35 228 Chile (E) U.S. 1977-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
36 924 China (E) U.S. 1980-2010 1961-2010 1984-2010 
37 233 Colombia (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
38 632 Comoros France 1983-2010 1961-2010 1981-2010 
39 636 Congo, Dem. Rep. U.S. 1982-2010 1961-2010 1970-2000 
40 634 Congo, Rep. France 1968-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
41 238 Costa Rica U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
42 960 Croatia Germany 1992-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
43 423 Cyprus Germany 1969-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
44 935 Czech Republic (E) Germany 1993-2010 1993-2010 1996-2010 
45 128 Denmark Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
46 611 Djibouti U.S. 1996-2009 1961-2010 1982-2010 
47 321 Dominica U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1982-2010 
48 243 Dominican Republic U.S. 1995-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
49 248 Ecuador (E) U.S. 1970-2008 1961-2005 1970-2010 
50 469 Egypt, Arab Rep. (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
51 253 El Salvador U.S. 1983-2005 1961-2010 1970-2010 
52 642 Equatorial Guinea France 1985-2010 1961-2010 1973-2010 
53 643 Eritrea U.S. - 1961-2010 1998-2010 
54 939 Estonia Germany 1993-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
55 644 Ethiopia U.S. 1985-2008 1961-2010 1970-2010 
56 819 Fiji U.S. 1974-2010 1961-2010 1975-2010 
57 172 Finland Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
58 132 France Germany 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
59 646 Gabon France 1968-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
60 648 Gambia, The U.K. 1977-2010 1961-2010 1971-2010 
61 915 Georgia U.S. 1995-2010 1995-2010 1996-2010 
62 134 Germany U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
63 652 Ghana (E) U.S. 1964-2009 1961-2010 1970-2010 
64 174 Greece 1960-80 U.S.; 1981-Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
65 328 Grenada U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1979-2010 
66 258 Guatemala U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
67 656 Guinea 1960-73 France; 1974-U.S. 1986-2006 1961-2009 1970-2010 
68 654 Guinea-Bissau U.S. 1975-2010 1961-2010 1981-2010 
69 336 Guyana 1960-75 U.K.; 1976-U.S. 1966-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
70 263 Haiti U.S. 1994-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
71 268 Honduras U.S. 1979-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
72 532 Hong Kong, China (E) U.S. 1982-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
73 944 Hungary (E) 1960-91 U.S.; 1992-Germany 1971-2010 1968-2010 1986-2010 














75 534 India (E) 1960-79 U.K.; 1980-U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
76 536 Indonesia (E) U.S. 1983-2010 1967-2010 1970-2010 
77 429 Iran, Islamic Rep. U.S. 1960-2009 1961-2010 1970-2010 
78 433 Iraq U.S. - 1961-2010 1970-2010 
79 178 Ireland 1960-78 U.K.; 1979-Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
80 436 Israel (E) U.S. 1982-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
81 136 Italy Germany 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
82 343 Jamaica (E) U.S. 1961-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
83 158 Japan U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
84 439 Jordan (E) U.S. 1966-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
85 916 Kazakhstan U.S. 1994-2010 1994-2010 1996-2010 
86 664 Kenya (E) U.S. 1967-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
87 826 Kiribati Australia - 1961-2010 1990-2005 
88 542 Korea, Rep. (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
89 443 Kuwait U.S. 1975-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
90 917 Kyrgyz Republic U.S. 1993-2010 1993-2010 1997-2010 
91 544 Lao PDR U.S. 1979-2008 1961-2010 1970-2010 
92 941 Latvia Germany 1993-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
93 446 Lebanon U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
94 666 Lesotho S. Africa 1980-2010 1961-2010 1972-2010 
95 668 Liberia U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
96 672 Libya U.S. 1963-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
97 946 Lithuania (E) Germany 1994-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
98 137 Luxembourg 1960-78 Belgium; 1979- Germany 1985-2010 1961-2010 - 
99 674 Madagascar France 1970-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
100 676 Malawi U.S. 1963-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
101 548 Malaysia (E) U.S. 1966-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
102 556 Maldives U.S. 1978-2010 1961-2010 1982-2010 
103 678 Mali France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
104 181 Malta France 1969-2010 1961-2010 1972-2010 
105 682 Mauritania 1960-73 France; 1974-U.S. 1964-2008 1961-2010 1970-2010 
106 684 Mauritius (E) U.K. 1967-2010 1961-2010 1972-2010 
107 273 Mexico (E) U.S. 1976-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
108 868 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. U.S. 1996-2010 1961-2010 1996-2010 
109 921 Moldova U.S. 1995-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
110 948 Mongolia U.S. 1993-2010 1990-2010 1995-2010 
111 686 Morocco (E) France 1969-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
112 688 Mozambique U.S. 1994-2010 1961-2010 1988-2010 
113 518 Myanmar U.S. 1975-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
114 728 Namibia S. Africa 1991-2010 1961-2010 1994-2010 
115 558 Nepal 1960-82 U.S.; 1983-India 1974-2009 1961-2010 1970-2010 
116 138 Netherlands Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
117 353 Netherlands Antilles U.S. 1980-2010 1961-2010 1970-2009 
118 196 New Zealand Australia 1969-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
119 278 Nicaragua U.S. 1990-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
120 692 Niger France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
121 694 Nigeria (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
122 142 Norway Germany 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
123 449 Oman U.S. 1980-2010 1961-2010 1977-2010 
124 564 Pakistan (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
125 283 Panama U.S. 1986-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
126 853 Papua New Guinea 1960-85 Australia; 1986-U.S. 1974-2010 1961-2010 1979-2010 
127 288 Paraguay U.S. 1990-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
128 293 Peru (E) U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
129 566 Philippines (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
130 964 Poland(E) Germany 1991-2010 1961-2010 1986-2010 
131 182 Portugal Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
132 453 Qatar U.S. 1980-2010 1966-2010 1976-2010 
133 968 Romania U.S. 1994-2010 1961-2010 1976-2010 
134 922 Russia (E) U.S. 1995-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
135 714 Rwanda 1960-73 Belgium; 1974-U.S. 1966-2008 1961-2010 1970-2010 
136 716 Sao Tome and Principe U.S. 1988-2010 1961-2010 1981-2010 
137 862 Samoa Australia 1983-2010 1961-2010 1975-2010 
138 135 San Marino Germany - 1961-2010 1996-2010 
139 456 Saudi Arabia U.S. 1997-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
140 722 Senegal France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
141 718 Seychelles U.S. 1979-2010 1961-2010 1981-2010 
142 724 Sierra Leone 1960-77 U.K.; 1978-U.S. 1966-2008 1961-2010 1970-2010 
143 576 Singapore (E) Malaysia 1972-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
144 936 Slovak Rep. (E) Germany 1993-2010 1993-2010 1996-2010 
145 961 Slovenia (E) Germany 1993-2010 1992-2010 1996-2010 
146 813 Solomon Islands 1960-85 Australia; 1986-U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1982-2010 
147 726 Somalia U.S. - 1961-1990 1970-2010 
148 199 South Africa (E) U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
149 184 Spain Germany 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 















151 361 St. Kitts and Nevis U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1988-2010 
152 362 St. Lucia U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1983-2010 
153 364 St. Vincent & the Grenad. U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1983-2010 
154 732 Sudan 1960-71 U.K.; 1972-U.S. 1978-1984 1961-2010 1970-2010 
155 366 Suriname U.S. 1991-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
156 734 Swaziland S. Africa 1974-2010 1961-2010 1973-2010 
157 144 Sweden Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
158 146 Switzerland Germany 1964-2010 1961-2010 1996-2010 
159 463 Syrian Arab Republic U.S. 2003-2008 1961-2005 1970-2010 
160 923 Tajikistan U.S. 1997-2010 1992-2010 1997-2010 
161 738 Tanzania U.S. 1973-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
162 578 Thailand (E)  U.S. 1977-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
163 742 Togo France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
164 866 Tonga Australia 1981-2010 1961-2010 1989-2010 
165 369 Trinidad & Tobago (E) 1960-75 U.K.; 1976-U.S. 1965-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
166 744 Tunisia (E) France 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
167 186 Turkey (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
168 925 Turkmenistan U.S. - 1994-2001 1996-2010 
169 746 Uganda U.S. 1980-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
170 926 Ukraine U.S. 1992-2010 1993-2010 1996-2010 
171 466 United Arab Emirates U.S. - 1966-2010 1976-2010 
172 112 United Kingdom Germany 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
173 111 United States U.S. 1960-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
174 298 Uruguay U.S. 1976-2010 1964-2010 1970-2010 
175 927 Uzbekistan U.S. - 1999-2000 1996-2010 
176 846 Vanuatu 1960-89 France; 1990-U.S. 1981-2010 1961-2010 1985-2000 
177 299 Venezuela, RB (E) U.S. 1964-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
178 582 Vietnam U.S. 1996-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
179 474 Yemen, Rep. U.S. 1996-2010 1990-2010 1995-2010 
180 754 Zambia U.S. 1965-2010 1961-2010 1970-2010 
181 698 Zimbabwe (E) U.S. 1965-2007 1961-2008 1984-2010 
Notes: The base countries are primarily based on Shambaugh (QJE) and complemented by information from 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions and CIA Factbook
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Table 1 (a): Tests for Structural Breaks in the Trilemma Indexes 
 




Mean 0.379 0.408 0.393 0.149 
Change  +0.029 -0.015 -0.245 
t-stats (p-value)  1.32 (0.11) 0.72 (0.24) 14.69 (0.00)*** 
Exchange Rate Stability 
Mean 0.705 0.430 0.466 0.671 
Change  -0.274 +0.036 +0.205 
t-stats (p-value)  7.68 (0.00)*** 2.04 (0.03)** 13.28 (0.00)*** 
Financial Openness 
Mean 0.430 0.468 0.704 0.955 
Change  +0.038 +0.236 +0.251 
t-stats (p-value)  1.95 (0.04)** 4.84 (0.00)*** 6.37 (0.00)*** 
 





Mean 0.500 0.422 0.448 0.485 
Change  -0.078 +0.026 +0.037 
t-stats (p-value)  1.75 (0.06)* 1.12 (0.14) 1.41 (0.09)* 
Exchange Rate Stability 
Mean 0.756 0.804 0.687 0.803 
Change  +0.048 -0.117 +0.112 
t-stats (p-value)  0.74 (0.76) 5.44 (0.00)*** 6.15 (0.00)*** 
Financial Openness 
Mean 0.232 0.330 0.287 0.364 
Change  +0.098 -0.042 +0.077 
t-stats (p-value)  3.79 (0.00)*** 2.00 (0.03)** 4.71 (0.00)*** 






Mean 0.524 0.466 0.514 0.440 
Change  -0.058 +0.048 -0.074 
t-stats (p-value)  2.21 (0.03)** 2.15 (0.02)** 3.15 (0.04)** 
Exchange Rate Stability 
Mean 0.834 0.697 0.499 0.543 
Change  -0.136 -0.199 +0.044 
t-stats (p-value)  4.35 (0.00)*** 10.01 (0.00)*** 1.89 (0.00)*** 
Financial Openness 
Mean 0.212 0.230 0.243 0.483 
Change  +0.018 +0.013 +0.240 
t-stats (p-value)  5.03 (0.04)** 0.49 (0.32) 10.52 (0.00)*** 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1(b): Summary of the Structural Breaks Tests  
 




Monetary Independence 1997-98 
Exchange Rate Stability 
1997-98  
(1973 for non-Euro Countries) 






Monetary Independence 1973 
Exchange Rate Stability 2001 






Monetary Independence 2001 
Exchange Rate Stability 1982 
Financial Openness 1997-98 
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Table 2: Regression for the Linear Relationship between the Trilemma Indexes: tti,ti,ti,  ++=1 KAOPENcERSbMIa jjj  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  FULL 1970-72 1974-81 1983-96 1999-2010 1983-89 1991-2010 1983-2000 2002-2010 
Monetary Independence 1.084 0.932 1.354 0.970 0.708 1.150 0.680 0.923 0.773 
  (0.040)*** (0.132)*** (0.068)*** (0.065)*** (0.128)*** (0.077)*** (0.080)*** (0.063)*** (0.136)*** 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.568 0.640 0.582 0.665 0.077 0.648 0.320 0.637 0.098 
  (0.030)*** (0.075)*** (0.084)*** (0.050)*** (0.081) (0.065)*** (0.070)*** (0.049)*** (0.082) 
KA Openness 0.457 0.398 0.295 0.415 0.817 0.324 0.714 0.459 0.788 
  (0.020)*** (0.047)*** (0.062)*** (0.033)*** (0.056)*** (0.047)*** (0.038)*** (0.030)*** (0.059)*** 
ERM x MI -0.175 – 0.356 -0.232 -0.379 -0.462 -0.158 -0.078 -0.660 
  (0.073)** – (0.343) (0.119)* (0.150)** (0.321) (0.101) (0.090) (0.145)*** 
ERM x ERS -0.024 – 0.299 0.024 0.017 0.170 -0.092 -0.093 -0.071 
  (0.053) – (0.189) (0.075) (0.080) (0.120) (0.078) (0.065) (0.076) 
ERM x KAOPEN 0.013 – -0.282 0.041 0.094 0.174 0.062 0.006 0.188 
  (0.049) – (0.131)** (0.057) (0.058) (0.151) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)*** 
LDC x MI 0.149 0.532 -0.102 0.364 0.333 0.243 0.458 0.396 0.235 
  (0.045)*** (0.163)*** (0.095) (0.070)*** (0.132)** (0.086)*** (0.084)*** (0.068)*** (0.141)* 
LDC x ERS -0.151 -0.398 -0.142 -0.254 0.399 -0.269 0.130 -0.233 0.395 
  (0.033)*** (0.091)*** (0.091) (0.053)*** (0.079)*** (0.070)*** (0.072)* (0.052)*** (0.079)*** 
LDC x KAOPEN -0.185 -0.222 -0.082 -0.144 -0.485 0.045 -0.423 -0.256 -0.439 
  (0.027)*** (0.075)*** (0.080) (0.048)*** (0.064)*** (0.063) (0.045)*** (0.043)*** (0.069)*** 
Observations 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Adjusted R-squared 2,450 180 480 840 710 420 1,190 1,080 530 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
NOTES: The dummy for ERM countries is assigned for the countries and years that corresponds to participation in the ERM (i.e., Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg from 1979 on; Spain from 1989; U.K. only for 1990-91; Portugal from 1992; Austria from 1995; Finland from 1996; and 
Denmark and Greece from 1999) or ERM II (Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia from 2004; and Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, and Slovak Rep. from 2005).  
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Table 3: Regression for the Linear Relationship between the Trilemma Indexes: t,jti,ti,ti,  ++=1  tijjj IRdKAOPENcERSbMIa  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  FULL 1970-72 1974-81 1983-96 1999-2010 1983-89 1991-2010 1983-2000 2002-2010 
Monetary Independence 1.050 0.941 1.359 0.862 0.606 1.065 0.581 0.825 0.650 
  (0.041)*** (0.117)*** (0.070)*** (0.074)*** (0.086)*** (0.090)*** (0.067)*** (0.069)*** (0.093)*** 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.536 0.598 0.600 0.562 -0.056 0.590 0.247 0.531 -0.023 
  (0.031)*** (0.083)*** (0.081)*** (0.049)*** (0.082) (0.065)*** (0.074)*** (0.048)*** (0.083) 
KA Openness 0.438 0.384 0.292 0.423 0.832 0.337 0.699 0.455 0.802 
  (0.020)*** (0.048)*** (0.059)*** (0.033)*** (0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.046)*** 
ERM x MI -0.229 – 0.300 -0.223 -0.291 -0.340 -0.126 -0.086 -0.690 
  (0.078)*** – (0.354) (0.122)* (0.135)** (0.267) (0.101) (0.098) (0.113)*** 
ERM x ERS -0.026 – 0.252 0.017 0.146 0.066 -0.039 -0.062 0.004 
  (0.054) – (0.198) (0.072) (0.087)* (0.114) (0.084) (0.064) (0.086) 
ERM x KAOPEN 0.036 – -0.279 0.004 0.080 0.040 0.079 -0.007 0.210 
  (0.048) – (0.131)** (0.058) (0.051) (0.128) (0.049) (0.052) (0.048)*** 
LDC x MI 0.162 0.526 -0.166 0.451 0.430 0.296 0.544 0.479 0.352 
  (0.046)*** (0.153)*** (0.102) (0.079)*** (0.091)*** (0.098)*** (0.073)*** (0.074)*** (0.100)*** 
LDC x ERS -0.127 -0.339 -0.131 -0.157 0.476 -0.229 0.171 -0.131 0.458 
  (0.033)*** (0.098)*** (0.090) (0.052)*** (0.078)*** (0.070)*** (0.077)** (0.051)*** (0.077)*** 
LDC x KAOPEN -0.229 -0.188 -0.171 -0.207 -0.580 -0.000 -0.472 -0.302 -0.531 
  (0.030)*** (0.106)* (0.085)** (0.051)*** (0.057)*** (0.078) (0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.062)*** 
IR as % of GDP 0.657 0.596 -0.192 1.368 0.649 0.964 0.952 1.416 0.624 
 (0.153)*** (0.551) (0.682) (0.333)*** (0.226)*** (0.467)** (0.178)*** (0.287)*** (0.220)*** 
LDC x IR -0.317 -0.943 0.534 -1.019 -0.171 -0.367 -0.559 -1.145 -0.169 
 (0.166)* (0.580) (0.704) (0.352)*** (0.245) (0.490) (0.197)*** (0.308)*** (0.243) 
ERM x IR 0.076  0.664 0.484 -0.562 1.346 -0.433 0.037 -0.277 
  (0.295)  (1.082) (0.473) (0.247)** (0.702)* (0.323) (0.464) (0.224) 
Observations 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Adjusted R-squared 2,421 173 471 835 705 415 1,185 1,075 525 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
NOTES: The dummy for ERM countries is assigned for the countries and years that corresponds to participation in the ERM (i.e., Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg from 1979 on; Spain from 1989; U.K. only for 1990-91; Portugal from 1992; Austria from 1995; Finland from 1996; and 
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Figure 2: International Reserves/GDP, 1980-2010 
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Figure 4: The Trilemma and International Reserves Configurations over Time: 














































































Figure 5: The Evolution of Individual Trilemma Indexes 
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Figure 6: The Evolution of Trilemma Indexes   












1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Mon. Indep., IDC Exchr. Stab., IDC
KAOPEN, IDC
MI, ERS, and KAOPEN: Industrial Countries












1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Mon. Indep., EMG Exchr. Stab., EMG
KAOPEN, EMG
MI, ERS, and KAOPEN: Non-EMG Developing Countries












1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Mon. Indep., non-EMG LDC Exchr. Stab., non-EMG LDC
KAOPEN, non-EMG LDC
MI, ERS, and KAOPEN: Non-EMG Developing Countries
 42 
Figure 7: Policy Orientation of IDCs and LDCs 
(a) Cumulative Effects: )ˆˆˆ( and ,)ˆˆ( ),ˆˆ()ˆˆ( KAOPENcERSbMIaKAOPENcERSbKAOPENcMIa, ERSbMIa   
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Notes: The vertical lines correspond to the candidate break years.
The shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval for aMI+bERS+cKAOPEN.
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(b) Individual Effects KAOPENc ERS, bMI,a ˆandˆ ˆ  
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